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1. Introduction 
Capturing and storing carbon through afforestation has attracted considerable interest as a feasible way 
to mitigate global warming. The cost is generally lower than in projects targeting emission reductions 
from fossil fuel combustion. Further, studies point to that carbon sequestration in forests is cheaper in 
developing countries than in industrialized countries (Richards and Stokes 2004). The Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol provides developing countries with an 
opportunity to reduce carbon emissions and trade certified emissions reductions (CER) to countries 
with CO2 reduction obligations. The CDM opportunity is supposed to serve two purposes, i.e. enhance 
development in addition to mitigate climate change. 
 
The mitigation efficiency of the CDM mechanism has been strongly debated for various reasons. One 
concern is whether CDM projects actually are additional to a baseline of social, technological and 
economic development and thus brings in genuine emission reductions. Another concern relates to 
whether the project will suffer from leakages, i.e. lead to carbon emission outside the defined project 
border. The general issue of carbon leakage is discussed by Chomitz (2000, 2002) and Aukland et al. 
(2003), whereas Schwarze et al. (2002) focuses leakage particularly in forest based GHG mitigation 
projects and Garcia- Olivia and Masera (2004) deal with issues related to carbon sequestration in soil.  
 
There has been less focus on the capacity of CDM projects to reduce poverty, although many point to 
CDM as a good opportunity for enhanced development. Whether the different designs or modalities of 
CDM projects actually will serve the twin targets of carbon sequestration and poverty reduction is, 
however, not yet well understood, and so far the development issue associated with CDM is hardly 
analyzed in empirical terms. As a consequence, the scale of trade in certified emission reductions 
(CERs) from CDM projects as reflected in the flow of carbon payment is taken by default as indicator 
of the development impact as well as climate mitigation effect. The study of a CDM treeplanting 
project reported below aims at providing a more holistic approach to questions concerning the capacity 
of CDM projects to fulfil their dual target.  
 
In the first commitment period (2008-2012) of the Kyoto Protocol, carbon uptake in trees is included 
in the portfolio of compliance activities. Afforestation and reforestation are accepted as credible, but 
carbon sequestration in other types of vegetation and soil is not yet a CDM project option. Among 
forestation projects, tree plantations so far seem to have a better esteem than community forests 
because monitoring is less demanding for plantations than for tree planting in small scale farming. 
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Large-scale plantations may also have the capacity to insure towards sequestration failure through 
buffer funds of carbon credits.  
 
Certified emission reductions (CER) from afforestation projects are not accepted in the EU carbon 
trading system. There is so far only one afforestation projects among approved CDM projects. In the 
pipeline there are 12 afforestation and reforestation projects generating less than a percentage of total 
2012 CER (UNEP-Risø 2008). The scale of forestry projects is likely to increase, however, and 
forestry projects are also a part of the international market for environmental services that evolves 
parallel to the Kyoto process, driven by private demand or government initiatives from countries 
outside the Kyoto Protocol. The efficiency of carbon mitigation projects outside the Kyoto-framework 
is of course just as important an issue as for those that may emerge within the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
The purpose here is to study the potential effects of establishing a CDM tree plantation project in 
Tanzania on carbon sequestration and on the income level of various rural or urban socio-economic 
groups. Tanzania is a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol and registered as a CDM host country, but no 
project is registered in Tanzania so far (UNEP Risø 2007). The country is rich in land and the 
mitigation capacity embedded in the Tanzanian Forest Action Plan, if implemented, would accumulate 
to about 215 million tons CO2 over three decades (Makundi 2001). Within softwood and hardwood 
plantations carbon sequestration can be obtained at a cost of USD 0.3-0.6 per ton carbon as estimated 
by Makundi (2001). Currently, there are plantations both under private and public ownership in 
Tanzania. Private owners already provide options for carbon offsets that are targeting future 
international carbon trade.  
 
If CDM tree plantations can reduce poverty in addition to sequestering carbon, they would indeed be 
useful for a poor agricultural country like Tanzania, one of the poorest countries in the world.  In 
Tanzania, estimated per capita income in 2005 was USD 330. According to the Household Budget 
Survey of 2000/2001, 19 percent of the population are below the national food poverty line and 
altogether 36 percent are below the national basic needs poverty line (NBS 2002).  
 
Whereas project characteristics of tree plantations in Tanzania have been studied (Makundi 2001) the 
economic repercussions and social effects of such CDM projects have not been outlined. There are 
several reasons why it is necessary to look beyond the forested plot for a more complete understanding 
of the project efficiency in terms of economic outcome and carbon capture. The allocation of land for 
additional tree plantations may crowd out agricultural activity. As a consequence, food prices may 
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rise, affecting the rural landless and urban poor, while increasing the flow of land rent to urban and 
rural landowners. Further, tree plantations will create employment opportunities, which most likely 
will benefit the poorer groups of rural households. However, available labour for other activities will 
be in shorter supply and rural households’ income growth may turn out to exceed or fall below what 
project employment and associated wage payments promise. Finally, it matters who is the project host 
and consequently how the carbon premium is distributed. Effects on income distribution and growth 
turn out differently depending upon the ownership. With government ownership, political decisions 
determine the saving and expenditure pattern in the wake of the carbon premium. With private 
ownership, the carbon premium may float to foreigners, to domestic high-income urban or rural 
households or to poor households if the plantation is a joint effort at village level. The indirect effects 
may be different depending on how the carbon premium is spent, as the households have different 
levels of income and patterns of consumption. As a consequence of market repercussions, the carbon 
cycle outside the plantation borders may also be affected. Hence, the final effect of a project depends 
on the economic framework conditions and how the markets work, for instance if there are limited 
resources of labour and land or not. 
 
The significance of economy-wide effects in afforestation projects has been studied by Adams et al. 
(1993) for the USA. When simulating the US agriculture with tree planting for carbon sequestration as 
an option for farmers, Adams et al. included effects on the timber market of lower prices and increased 
supply. The representative consumer in the US thus carries the cost of trees crowding out food 
production, but enjoys the benefit of falling timber prices for housing and other products. The study 
show that the effect of afforestation on consumer surplus is negative and further that the effect is 
substantial and highly sensitive to the ambition of the carbon sequestration program. It also follows 
that the cost of carbon sequestration is considerably lower when timber is harvested than not, as 
declining timber prices soften the impact of increasing food prices. Consequently, as shown by Adams 
et al (1993) for the US, cost of carbon sequestration depends on consumer preferences, how relative 
prices change and on supply side adjustments. These results signal that CDM projects within forestry 
and agriculture may also generate substantial indirect economic effects, possibly also with 
implications for national carbon emissions. For a poor country it may be particularly useful to consider 
if such projects actually contribute to poverty reduction or not. 
 
The CDM introduces incentives and verification criteria for carbon sequestration, but there are no 
particular incentives or criteria for fulfilling a poverty reduction target. The CDM project host will 
benefit from transfers of external funds through the carbon premium, but there is still reason to 
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question the effect on poverty reduction since inflow of foreign exchange does not necessarily increase 
the income of the population below the poverty line.  
 
Although the potential for carbon sequestration through tree planting seems considerable, some 
caution may be necessary for environmental reasons. Plantations cause concerns over the expansion of 
land under monoculture, mainly over loss of biodiversity. There is also the problem that trees may 
affect water retention capacity negatively. Trees have deeper roots than other vegetation and are able 
to absorb and transpire water even in dry periods. A general reduction in the groundwater table may 
thus harm food crops and other vegetation with less deep root systems. Hence, forestation in particular 
of fast growing species frequently found in plantations may increase the social and environmental 
scale of drought (DFID, 2005). 
 
Can it really be necessary to look at the macro-effects of a single tree-planting project? Yes, because 
the point of interest in this context is the dimension of the spillovers in the whole economy in relation 
to the magnitudes of the project’s on-site effect. A CDM project has a specific role to play in climate 
policy and economic development. If economy-wide analyses show reasons for concern over impact 
on income distribution and carbon sequestration, the project criteria should be reconsidered and 
possibly overhauled to secure compliance with the basic targets of the CDM. Further, if CDM carbon 
sequestration projects shall be of more than marginal interest in climate policy, the scale of land use 
change must also be non-negligible and will thus generate substantial repercussions both in economic 
and environmental terms. 
 
As far as we know, the study presented below adds new information along several dimensions to the 
literature on CDM efficiency. First, our study takes into account the market repercussions within the 
host country when resources like labour and land are allocated to CDM tree plantations. Further, we 
trace economy-wide effects on income, income distribution and carbon leakage associated with the 
inflow and distribution of carbon payment to potential project hosts. To do so, we apply a computable 
general equilibrium model (CGE) for Tanzania developed at the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (Löfgren et al. 2002). The model is disaggregated in agricultural activities and household 
segments, and further developed in this study to keep account of the carbon cycle associated with land 
use. A particularly interesting result is that the plantation induces a negative carbon leakage in the 
same order of magnitude as within the CDM plantation project itself due to increased 
(uncompensated) carbon sequestration in agricultural land. 
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2. A CDM tree-farming project in Tanzania 
Tanzania already has tree plantations covering about 80,000 ha owned by the government. The main 
genera planted are Pinus and Cupressus. In addition there are about 100,000 ha of private woodlots 
and plantations (NFP 2005). A part of the more recently afforested area is already targeting the 
emerging international market for carbon emissions rights and plans are announced for additional 
plantations covering almost 100,000 ha. 
 
To approach the question of carbon efficiency and capacity to reduce poverty we incorporate a Pinus 
patula tree plantation project in a CGE model for Tanzania. The investments in tree-planting cover 
land and labour expenditures according to a typical time profile of planting and management. It takes 
20 years before trees in the plantation project become mature. Along the project development path, 
annual carbon uptake is calculated following the natural rate of tree growth. By assumption, no timber 
harvest is taking place in the project period.  
 
In this study we are looking at economy-wide consequences, hence we do not consider the private 
financial arrangements or profitability for carrying out the plantation projects. We assume that the 
financial aspects are solved by private or public agents and motivated by the expected project 
profitability resulting from the carbon premium.  
 
The tree plantation we have in mind is an expansion of the 40,000 ha Sao Hill forest plantation in 
Southern Tanzania. Growth characteristics of the Pinus patula plantation is taken from observations on 
99 plots in Sao Hill (Chamshama and Philip 1980). The average annual aboveground biomass 
accumulation and carbon accumulation was found to be 11.7 Mg per ha and 5.9 Mg per ha 
respectively. The cost of plantation establishment was set to 225 USD per ha based on Sathaye et al. 
(2001).  
 
Whereas the existing plantation delivers logs to Southern Paper Mill and Sao Hill Sawmill, the 
hypothetical CDM plantation project depicted here is only meant for carbon storage, thus making sure 
that the project has no other income sources than the carbon premium and that there is no leakage 
through timber markets. We implement this new plantation activity in a standard CGE model 
(Löfgren, et al., 2002; Thurlow, J. and Wobst, P., 2003) with base year 2000 and enterprises, 
households and government as decision makers. Among a total of 43 production sectors there are 21 
agricultural sectors (crops) and a separate sector for forestry and hunting combined.  
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The CGE model assumes maximizing behaviour by producers and consumers. Each sector produces a 
single good and the output is formalized as a Leontief aggregate of value added and use of 
intermediates. The value added element is a CES function of the primary input factors land, labour and 
produced capital.  This means that there is substitution between land, labour and capital, but not 
between land/labour/capital combined and a more intensive agricultural practice represented by higher 
use of intermediates like fertilizer and pesticides.  
 
Heterogeneity of land and labour makes the return to input factors differ across sectors. Land and 
labour allowances are exogenous and factor prices flexible. Households receive wage income and 
revenue from land and produced capital assets. Household demand is represented by a linear 
expenditure system (LES) based on a Stone utility function (Stone 1954, Dervis et al.1982). Public 
consumption per capita is fixed and surplus government income equals government saving. Foreign 
saving is exogenous and the domestic price level adjusts to balance the external account. Import of 
commodities is determined as a price sensitive CES aggregate of demand of the foreign and domestic 
varieties in line with the approach of Armington (1969). A similar relation determines how producers 
allocate their supply between domestic and foreign demand. The world market prices are fixed. 
 
The inflow of foreign exchange in terms of carbon premium is creating a slack in the external balance, 
making room for an increase of imports. Rural household groups participate in plantation work and 
thus receive additional wage income. By assumption, all plantation work is carried out by labour from 
rural households below food poverty line.  
 
The total level of investments is basically assumed to be policy given and thus exogenous, whereas 
private saving rates are adjusted by a common factor to generate the necessary amount of domestic 
finance to support the given rate of capital accumulation. Saving rates vary across household income 
groups and are adjusted by the same percentage points in this process. The economy operating on 
these terms can be characterized as investment driven. We first study the impact of the CDM 
plantation project under an investment driven closure rule, then under a savings driven alternative 
where household saving rates are fixed and factor income is adjusted to achieve the same investments 
path. 
 
A particular useful model property for our purpose is that households are split in rural and urban 
categories, each further disaggregated into 6 urban and 6 rural household groups based on income 
level and education of head of household. The poorest households are those below the food poverty 
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line, followed by households above the food poverty line, but below basic needs poverty line. The 
non-poor households (approximately 60 percent of the population) are divided in 4 groups according 
to income and educational level of head of household.  
 
The baseline scenario assumes annual growth in real investments of about 4 percent and factor neutral 
technical change of 1 per cent per year in all production sectors. The corresponding growth in GDP 
amounts to 4 percent per year on average over the period 2001-2020. More details about the baseline 
scenario are presented in Appendix 1.  
 
For studying the overall carbon efficiency of the project, we implemented a carbon cycle module 
covering both aboveground and belowground carbon for each agricultural activity. For agricultural 
crops the carbon module calculates change in carbon stock both in biomass and soils, but the carbon 
sequestration of these sinks are not included in the CDM project. As a consequence, there are no 
carbon incentives influencing farmers' behaviour. Every year 4 percent of the carbon stock in the soil 
is released to the atmosphere, while soil organic carbon from current crop residues is added to the 
stock. Soil organic carbon generated from the roots and residue of crops left in the soil in one year 
enters the soil carbon stock the following year. The amount of roots and residues are crop specific and 
proportional to the yield per ha land. 
 
The carbon accumulation in the plantation is rewarded equally much per tonne every year and only the 
amount of carbon sequestered in trees is included. The annual addition to the carbon stock of the tree 
stand is compensated by a premium of 30 USD per tonne C, corresponding to about 8 USD per tonne 
CO2. A low price was chosen to reflect the higher uncertainty associated with CERs from land use, 
land use change and forestry (LULUCF) projects. Currently, carbon is traded for slightly above 20 
EURO per ton CO2 (73 EURO per ton carbon) in the market for EU allowances (January 2008). 
 
We compare the prospects along the economic baseline scenario with 5 different designs of CDM 
plantation projects. The different plantation initiatives use the same amount of resources in terms of 
land and labour, and plant the same amount of trees and receive the same carbon premium. However, 
they differ in terms of project ownership, and distribution of income from the CDM project activity. 
 
The carbon premium is assumed to come from the international carbon market and add to the inflow 
of foreign capital, which is exogenous by assumption. Common for all scenarios is further that there is 
no timber harvest from the plantation during the project’s lifetime of 20 years. In that way there is no 
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reason for concern over carbon leakage through the timber market. In all the scenarios 1-5, the wage 
income earned through plantation work is allocated to poor rural households below food poverty line, 
hence all direct expenditure (except land rent) target the poorest households. 
 
The carbon premium is paid annually on the basis of carbon accumulated in the tree stands. The 
project design means that a total carbon premium of 1 244 billion Tanzanian shilling (BTsh) is 
received by the project host and 11.4 BTsh or about one percent of the project value is paid as wages 
over the 20 years project lifetime.  
 
A premium of USD 30 paid per tonne carbon and the low on-site plantation costs allow for solid 
return. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the income and cost flows of the plantation given this level of carbon 
premium. The carbon premium inflow is determined by the annual biomass growth rate of the tree 
stand. The land rent is fixed according to existing private plantation’s compensation for use of 
government land. 
 
Figure 1. Time profile of carbon payment. 2001-2021. BTsh 
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Figure 2. Labour cost and land rent. 2001-2021. BTsh 
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As is clearly seen from these figures, the carbon premium is low in the beginning, but escalates 
towards the end of the period. The costs are mainly associated with initial planting followed by some 
sequences with thinning. The time profiles of income and costs tend to make the surplus measured as 
net present value lower the higher the discount rate of the project host. However, in our study the 
focus is not on the decision to undertake the project and how this decision is influenced by the 
prospect to harvest profit now or in the future. The project is undertaken by assumption, and our 
purpose is to trace the repercussions and associated effects on income distribution and net carbon 
mitigation. In our results we present income growth of household segments accumulated over the 
project horizon without discounting. This can mimic the perspective of a social planner who is 
indifferent to distribution between generations. When comparing the results of various income groups 
we also ignore the differences in marginal utility of consumption. The reader may, however, attach 
subjective values to the income growth obtained by different income strata.        
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3. Scenarios 
Scenario 1: CDM plantation as private  farm initiative 
In this case the afforestation is undertaken as private farm projects, where the farmers receive the 
carbon premium. All land-owning farmers participate proportionally to their share in land, and carbon 
premium is allocated to farm household groups according to their share in land rent. This mimics the 
case when the CDM plantation area is large in scale and thus accessible to most farmers. Consequently 
scenario 1 assumes that even low-income rural households owning some land succeed in establishing 
tree stands that are credited for carbon uptake. As shown in table 1, the rural non-poor receive the 
dominant share of land rent and will dominate the carbon trade, but rural poor own as much as 25 
percent of the land and are thus also assumed to be actively involved in the CDM activity.  
 
Table 1. Share of land rent received by household group. 2000. Per cent 
Rural households   
   Poor below food poverty line 11.0 
   Poor above food poverty line1) 14.5 
   Non-poor 65.4 
Urban households   
   Poor below food poverty line 0.9 
   Poor above food poverty line1) 0.6 
   Non-poor 7.6 
1) Below basic need poverty line. 
Scenario 2: Plantation project hosted by urban-based landowners 
Non-poor urban citizens received almost 8 percent of the total land rent in the base year. Their land 
holdings are likely to be larger and provide easier monitoring and verification of CDM projects. Large 
estates may tend to underutilize land due to labour monitoring costs in labour intensive crop 
production (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986, Heltberg 1998). Given increased profitability 
introduced by the carbon premium, large estates may consider tree planting particularly attractive. The 
plantation project in scenario 2 is assumed to be hosted by the two wealthiest household groups among 
the urban non-poor. This scenario differs from scenario 1 only by distributing the carbon premium to 
other private income strata with a markedly different expenditure pattern. 
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Scenario 3: The Tanzanian government hosts the project 
Here the government pays the cost of establishing the plantation and receives the carbon premium. 
The surplus is earmarked for increased investments allocated to sectors according to the base year 
practice. This scenario is the only scenario that spends the whole carbon premium (net of plantation 
management cost) to increase investments. In all other scenarios the level of investments stays 
constant, whereas additional income is spent on private consumption.  
Scenario 4: A foreign investor hosts the project 
In this case the surplus from the CDM project is returned to international investors. Only the 
plantation management expenditure in terms of labour costs and land rent remains in Tanzania. This 
scenario resembles a situation where the government hosts the projects, and use the surplus from the 
carbon premium to pay down on foreign loans rather than on investments as in scenario 3. The 
difference would be that when the government pays down on foreign loans the external balance would 
improve as future foreign loan services would be somewhat reduced. 
Scenario 5: Private initiative of poor rural villages 
In this scenario we look for the result if the tree-planting initiative deliberately targets poor farmers. 
The poorest rural households are project owners and receive the whole plantation surplus. This kind of 
project is frequently regarded as difficult and expensive to monitor.  However, if forestation is widely 
used for carbon sequestration, remote sensing could even out the differences in monitoring costs 
between large, centrally situated and small, remote plantations in that respect. If undertaken jointly 
with development assistance, a difference in management costs could also be overcome.   
4. Results  
Before discussing the results in detail, we consider the various mechanisms that drive the outcome. 
The labour stock and the area of agricultural land are assumed fixed at the aggregate level. If we 
ignore the transfer of carbon premium and just think of the plantation as a politically enforced project, 
the new plantation crowds out labour and land so far utilized by other activities. The activity level in 
other sectors is slightly reduced due to the increased competition for labour and land outside the 
plantation. Further, when land and labour are withdrawn from the rest of the economy, the marginal 
return on produced capital will fall and settle somewhat below the level in the BAU scenario. There is 
no produced capital in the forest plantation. Hence, the produced capital generates less return and the 
overall return to produced capital is falling. The inefficiencies imposed by crowding out land and 
labour from other sectors may tend to reduce equilibrium wage and land rent. 
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When the carbon premium enters the economy, two main effects add to the picture. First it increases 
income of the CDM project host(s). This benefits rural poor and non-poor and urban households to 
various degrees, depending on ownership of factors and the spillovers associated with the spending 
behaviour of the CDM project hosts. Total household saving is not affected, as long as the domestic 
investment level is given (politically determined) and foreign saving is fixed by assumption (see 
section 4.3 for an alternative closure rule). Hence, higher household income increases consumer 
demand and may change the composition of total demand, production and external trade. The various 
household groups have specific consumption characteristics. The poorest will primarily increase 
demand for food, whereas the urban better-off will to a larger extent increase consumption of 
manufactured goods, some of them imported. Then there is a second main effect on the economy as 
the inflow of foreign currency as carbon premium creates a slack in the external balance and the 
import increases to fill the gap. This is driven by the appreciation of the domestic currency, i.e. the 
exchange rate falls and each dollar transfers to less Tanzanian shilling - a disadvantage to the 
exporters, but beneficial to importers of consumer and investment goods. Cheaper investment goods 
from abroad contribute to higher real investments and improved productivity. 
4.1 Poverty reduction 
Figure 3 shows the footprint of the carbon premium on gross domestic product (GDP). Scenario 3 
stands out in terms of GDP growth, which is three times as large as the value of the project measured 
as carbon. This neat multiplier effect illustrates that the Tanzanian economy is capital constrained and 
that investments are likely to yield a reasonable return. This is why a foreign owned project that 
withdraws the project surplus does not increase GDP at all (scenario 4). The money spent for 
plantation management is simply too little to make additional economic growth visible – investments 
are fixed and the income transfer is negligible. In scenarios 1, 2 and 5 investments are also fixed, but 
the project income remains with private households in Tanzania. GDP rises, but only about a third of 
the project value. Thus, we may conclude that the project value is not a good indicator of economic 
impact. 
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Figure 3. Accumulated GDP growth and carbon premium. 2001-2021 
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The GDP growth represents additional value added that is distributed to households as owners of the 
primary factors labour, land and capital. In addition to factor income growth, households may also 
receive transfers from abroad as carbon premium. The detailed distribution of factor income by 
household group is given in Appendix 3. 
 
Table 2. Factor income1) growth. 2001-2021. BTsh 
Scenarios 
 Base year 
1 2 3 4 5 
Wage income  99669 329 260 2404  2 362 
Land rent  17811  37 -11  261  0  53 
Profit  45710  42 -23  358 -1  62 
Total 163189 408 226 3022  2 477 
1) Factor income received by households, transfers not included. 
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Table 3. Factor contribution to total factor income1) growth. 2001-2021. Percent 
Scenarios 
 Base year 
1 2 3 4 5 
Wage income  61   81 115   80 122  76 
Land rent  11     9  -5    9   21  11 
Profit  28   10 -10   12  -43  13 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1) Received by households. 
 
Table 2 shows how GDP growth is allocated to the production factors labour, land and produced 
capital. All scenarios share the common feature that wage income growth is the dominant element of 
total factor income growth reflecting that Tanzania is a very labour intensive economy. The wage 
income growth is considerable compared with the project wage expenditure for all domestic projects . 
Even without the multiplier effect of higher investments as in scenario 3, the wage income growth 
amounts to 25-35 times the wage expenditure in the CDM project itself.  
 
Table 3 shows how the additional factor income is allocated in relative terms. Distributing CDM 
plantations in proportion to land holdings (Scenario 1) allocates income to factors in a similar way as a 
government plantation using the surplus for additional investments (Scenario 3), although their effects 
on GDP level differ considerably. Scenario 2 channels more than total income growth in absolute 
terms to labour but creates a loss in profit and land rent. In scenario 2 the carbon premium is earned by 
urban rich, who direct their demand growth towards manufacturing, services and imported goods. The 
agriculture is left behind, and land rent is falling somewhat. Profit is reduced as imports crowd out 
domestic produce. Scenario 5 returns the lowest share of factor income growth to labour. On the 
margin, all scenarios allocate more to labour, less to profit and, with some variation, about the same to 
land rent as the base year distribution. 
 
Whereas tables 2 and 3 present changes in factor income, the total effect on household income also 
includes their share in the carbon payment if hosting the CDM project. Figures 4-6 illustrate total 
income changes by household segment. Poverty is most pervasive in rural areas, and it is useful to 
start with a look at how the rural versus urban income develops. As shown in Figure 4, scenarios 1, 3 
and 5 are those that mainly channel income to the rural economy. The higher investments in scenario 3 
also allocate income to the urban economy through investment goods demand mainly supplied by 
manufacturing industries. Hence urban households receive about a third of total income growth when 
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the government hosts the projects and uses the surplus for investments.  When urban rich hosts the 
CDM project (scenario 2), there is practically no benefits to the rural economy.  
 
The fact that scenarios 1,3 and 5 favour the rural economy might raise expectations that the poor will 
benefit considerably from these CDM project designs. Figure 5 shows, however, that the larger share 
of income growth goes to non-poor households in scenarios 1 and 3. Scenario 2 leaves practically 
nothing to the poor. Only scenario 5, which by project design is targeting the rural poor, succeeds in 
getting the income through to the poor. 
 
As seen from Figure 6, it is even clearer that only a very small share of income growth trickles down 
to the poorest below food poverty line. Even though the plantation work is carried out by the rural 
poorest, their total income growth is only 15 percent of the CDM project value. 
 
When urban rich or foreigners host the project (scenario 4), there is hardly any income growth for the 
rural poorest below food poverty line. It seems necessary to involve the rural poorest as hosts to 
succeed in getting the benefits through and reduce the extreme poverty as is done in scenario 5. In that 
case, the benefit to the poorest even exceeds the total project value. However, the income growth of 
the urban poor below food poverty line still remains negligible in that case. 
 
Figures 4-6 referred to above show real income effects in base year prices by household segment. 
Households of various income levels have different consumption patterns. The CDM project imposes 
changes in relative prices, which hit the household segments differently. There are two drivers behind 
the price changes. One is the distribution of carbon premium among households and the associated 
shift in aggregate demand. The other is the appreciation of the Tanzanian shilling as the carbon 
payment in foreign currency enters the economy. Prices on imported goods for private consumption 
and investments fall, but food prices increase. Rural households comprising the majority of the poor 
experience that consumption growth in real terms is lower than income growth. For urban households 
the tendency is more ambiguous. Detailed tables are found in Appendix 3. 
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Figure 4. Income growth of rural and urban households. 2001-2021 
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Figure 5. Income growth of poor and non-poor households. 2001-2021 
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Figure 6.  Income growth of urban and rural households below food poverty line. 2001-2021 
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4.2. Net carbon effect 
The carbon stock at the plantation site is monitored and compensated within the project. However, the 
project also has indirect effects on the economy and thus also on emissions or sequestration of carbon 
in other land use. Our study tracks the effect on the stock of soil organic carbon in agricultural land 
due to increased demand and higher yields. Higher prices allow for more intensive farming and more 
plant residues are returned to the soil per unit land every year. 
 
In Scenario 3 the soil carbon sequestration is actually 20 percent larger than in the plantation itself 
(Table 4). Moreover, scenarios 1, 2 and 5 bind another 60-90 percent carbon in soil as compared with 
what is accumulated in the plantation itself. Hence, there is a considerable negative leakage in the 
project. There is particularly a build up of carbon in soil used for cash crops. The main cash crops are 
the perennials coffee, tea and tobacco with substantial use of imported agrochemicals. The 
appreciation of the domestic currency following the inflow of carbon premium lowers the cost of 
imported inputs. This effect dominates over the reduced incentives for cash crops due to the reduction 
in export prices in domestic currency. Hence the scale of cash crop farming rises more than food 
production. The cash crops are more efficient in carbon binding than the food crops under current 
agricultural practices. However, the food crops also improve carbon binding capacity per ha land due 
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to demand growth, price increases and more intensive use of fertilizer. The enhanced productivity 
through more intensive agriculture leaves more plant residues to the ground as organic carbon. The 
highest build-up of carbon in soils occurs in scenario 3 when the government is host and uses the 
carbon premium to increase investments. These result points to the potential synergy effects between 
climate mitigation and economic growth in poor agricultural economies.  
 
The results also illustrate the potential for carbon sequestration embedded in general policies for 
economic development. Increasing productivity in agriculture may contribute to reverse the carbon 
flow from agriculture, making food production a net absorber of carbon. 
 
Note that so far in this study farmers are not compensated for their contribution to carbon mitigation. 
If they had been able to trade CERs similar to the plantation host, or somehow compensated for this 
effect, the carbon dynamics might be accelerated. 
 
Table 4. Soil carbon accumulation 2001-2021. Mill. tonnes 
Scenarios   
1 2 3 4 5 
 Total 25.94 22.73 31.07 14.16 26.56 
 Plantation 14.10 14.10 14.10 14.10 14.10 
 Agricultural soil 11.84  8.63 16.98 0.06 12.46 
 Ratio of soil to 
 plantation sequestration  0.84  0.61  1.20 0  0.88 
 
The substantial negative carbon leakage of 60-120 per cent found in this study clearly contrasts the 
results obtained in earlier economy wide studies of CDM projects based on improved energy 
efficiency in coal use. Studies by Böhringer et al. (2003) and Glomsrød and Wei (2005) point to 
considerable carbon leakage through the coal market. Böhringer et al. estimated around 50 percent 
leakage following CDM investments in more efficient coal combustion in coal-fired power plants in 
India. Glomsrød and Wei found that coal cleaning might even increase the total CO2 emissions as 
reduced coal volume per thermal unit and high transportation cost shares in the end-user price of coal 
led to marked cost reductions to coal users. Both studies illustrate the rebound effect taking place as 
increased energy efficiency implies economic gains and lower fuel prices that in turn stimulate energy 
use. Thus, fossil energy efficiency projects involve a kind of subsidy to the user of the energy carrier 
involved, as also pointed out by Stern (2007). 
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The Kyoto Protocol’s CDM Executive Board has downplayed the role of the rebound effect by 
neglecting the so-called secondary leakages through markets. When considering the striking contrasts 
between the phenomenon of leakage in fossil energy efficiency projects and forestation projects 
observed in this study, such a position might undermine many efficient options for mitigation in terms 
of carbon sequestration and poverty reduction associated with land use projects.  
 
In the energy efficiency projects it is particularly important to remember that developing countries 
have high income elasticities for energy goods and energy intensive services like transportation. A 
project on fossil energy efficiency will rebound through the fossil energy market and the urban 
economy - while a land use change or forestry project will mainly encourage the rural economy with a 
low fossil intensity in demand. 
 
The results of Scenario 3 using the CDM project surplus for investments invites to consider the role of 
economic policy in carbon mitigation more closely. The low input/low output agriculture in many 
developing countries contains a vast potential for higher yields and enhanced carbon sequestration in 
soil. The soil could be reactivated as a carbon sink through fertilizer subsidies and taxes that adjust the 
income distribution. The monitoring of such carbon mitigation strategies might not be more costly and 
difficult than in specific and numerous private CDM projects. Programs for fertilizer subsidies were 
practiced in Tanzania, but abandoned as part of the structural adjustment policies during the 1990s 
partly due to the inefficiencies in distribution by agricultural parastatals. Considering the substantial 
climate mitigation potential of a more productive agriculture in Africa, fertilizer subsidies might serve 
as an important vehicle for climate mitigation as well as poverty reduction. The introduction of a 
subsidy should be compatible with a more efficient private market and distribution system. Subsidies 
on food crops would possibly be even more efficient as high-income producers of export crops like 
coffe and tobacco would not harvest the main share of the fertilizer subsidies (although that could be 
adjusted through an export tax). A food crop “carbon premium” would reach a higher share of less 
well-off farmers. For the poorest, the problem of a full up-front payment for fertilizer would still 
challenge their very strict cash constraints and problems with carrying the whole risk if the harvest 
fails. The level of fertilizer use in food production is generally low in Southern Africa. Hence the local 
pollution aspects are minor. However, fertilizer cause emissions of greenhouse gases (N2O) which 
must be considered to secure a net climate mitigation effect. 
 
It is important to have in mind that the effect of a reduction in the fertilizer price due to appreciation of 
the Tanzanian shilling is not fully absorbed in farm behaviour in our study. The reason is that the 
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model uses fixed proportion of fertilizer and other material inputs of farms, thus underestimating the 
tendency to higher yields and productivity. A model with substitution between fertilizer and other 
input variables would come closer to the actual effect on agricultural productivity and carbon 
sequestration in soil. This effect is more directly described by a study of Wiig et al (2001) based on a 
CGE with nitrogen cycle and endogenous soil productivity and land use for Tanzania. Devaluations 
carried out as part of the structural adjustment policies resulted in a increase in land use of about 20 
percent, reflecting the higher price on fertilizer and the substantial pressure towards more extensive 
agriculture. 
4.3. Alternative closure rule 
It may easily be forgotten in the CDM project context that the overall constraint for the economy are 
decisive for the result of economic interventions. For instance will the presence of constraints on the 
external balance lead to another result than if the country enjoys flexibility in terms of access to 
foreign loans.  
So far in this study it is assumed that the government controls the investment level through public 
investment programs or via public investments banks. The economy might alternatively operate under 
different framework conditions that have consequences also in terms of climate mitigation. Below we 
illustrate the impact of implementing the CDM project in a savings driven economy rather than an 
investment driven economy as discussed above. In the case of a savings driven economy, investments 
are no longer determined politically, but depend on the saving decisions made by households. With 
different saving rates among household groups the income distribution via return to the primary 
factors land, labour and produced capital, is the mechanism behind the general propensity to save. 
Total saving will then be sensitive to the change in structure of production and the tax base. Below we 
consider if the effects of the CDM plantation project in a savings driven economy deviate from in an 
investment driven economy. Two rigidities are still with us - the allocation of land ownership is fixed 
and the allocation of investments still follows the base year sector distribution. 
 
The key to understand the relation between the income distribution and level of saving is the wage to 
rent ratio. Basically the economy-wide wage/rent ratio varies to clear the capital market. The wage rate 
and return per unit capital and land will adjust to maintain the wage expenditure to rent-ratio by sector. 
In our savings driven scenario, the return to produced capital is scaled to match the level of the 
baseline scenario with fixed investment. The wage to land rent ratio will thus have to adjust to provide 
the required amount of saving in the savings driven alternative. 
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Figure 7 shows the increase in GDP across scenarios 1-5. Overall the induced GDP is larger than in 
the investment driven alternative, only in scenario 3 the GDP growth is somewhat lower. 
 
Figure 7. Accumulated GDP growth and carbon premium. Savings driven. 2001-2021 
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The effect of the CDM project in a savings driven economy on household segments are shown in 
figures 8-10. Scenario 1 is the only scenario where both the rural and urban population benefit more 
than in the case of an investment driven economy. By allocating the project surplus to households 
proportional to their shares in land rent, the wage to land rent ratio is shifted downwards and helps to 
clear the savings-investment market simply by scenario design. This moderates the efficiency loss 
associated with a larger reallocation of factors. However, it is mainly the non-poor who improve their 
situation. Only in scenario 3 the non-poor get less than in the investment driven case (Figure 8). Figure 
9 shows a minor improvement for the rural poor below food poverty line compared with the 
investment driven case. Other scenarios are quite similar to the investment driven alternative, although 
scenario 2 comes out with higher and scenario 3 with somewhat lower total income growth. Scenario 5 
generates a marketly higher income for the rural population as a whole, but this benefit does not reach 
the poor. The CDM under savings driven alternative is clearly more beneficial tot the non-poor than 
within a investment driven framework. 
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Figure 8. Income growth of urban and rural households. Savings driven. 2001-2021 
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Figure 9.  Income growth of poor and non-poor households. Savings driven. 2001-2021 
549
136
475
6
1663
1792
2357
2562
8
604
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
A
bs
ol
ut
e 
va
lu
es
 (B
.T
sh
)
Poor
Non-poor
 
 
25 
Figur 10.  Income growth of rural and urban households below food poverty line. Savings 
driven. 2001-2021 
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The factor income growth in the savings driven alternative is fairly homogenously allocated among 
factors (Appendix 4) and roughly corresponding to the base year factor income distribution, although 
labour is slightly better rewarded on the margin.   
 
Table 10. Soil carbon accumulation. Savings driven 2000 - 2021. Million tons 
Scenarios   
1 2 3 4 5 
 Total 27.2 24.3 30.3 14.2 27.6 
 Plantation 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 
 Agricultural soil 13.1 10.2 16.2  0.1 13.5 
 Ratio of soil to 
 plantation sequestration 0.93 0.73 1.15 0.01  0.95 
 
The project's capacity to absorbe carbon off-site is 7-12 per cent higher in scenarios 1, 2 and 5 in the 
case of a savings driven economy than in the investment driven alternative. With a government-hosted 
project (scenario 3) the off-site carbon uptake by agricultural soil is somewhat lower than in the 
investment driven alternative. These results reflect that GDP increases more in Scenarios 1, 2 and 5, 
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slightly less in scenario 3. The agriculture responds to growth by increasing productivity and soil 
carbon sequestration. 
5. Final remarks 
A main purpose of the CDM is to mitigate emissions of greenhouse gases. Our study for Tanzania 
indicates that tree plantations under domestic ownership interact with the economy in a way that 
enhances the carbon mitigation effect well beyond the project obligations. The income growth of 
domestically hosted projects leads in various degrees to increasing demand for agricultural products, 
thereby stimulating the rural economy. Further, the appreciation of the Tanzanian shilling folIowing 
the inflow of carbon payment makes use of imported fertilizer and pesticide cheaper. The agriculture 
becomes more productive and the higher yields in agriculture causes substantial additional carbon 
accumulation in soil. This effect increases total carbon sequestration 60-120 per cent above the 
plantation on-site effect, making the difference in total carbon sequestration across domestically 
hosted projects significant. If the plantation is foreign owned and revenue is returned abroad, there is 
no carbon sequestration additional to the plantation itself.  
 
In terms of total income growth, the plantation project earmarking the surplus for domestic 
investments seems to be superior. Moreover, in this scenario the rural population enjoys the largest 
income growth. However, the benefits to the very poor are very modest even in this case. Only when 
the poorest are actively targeted, they harvest the highest benefit. A foreign owned project hardly 
increase the income level. To approach both the twin targets of the CDM, the projects seem to need 
domestic hosts. 
 
The results of this study point to that CDM projects that capture identical amounts of carbon and 
receive the same amounts of carbon premium might give highly different effects on economic growth, 
income distribution and climate mitigation. It seems worth while to further study if there are 
systematic differences in indirect effects and total benefits from fossil fuel related projects and land 
use projects.  
 
There is reason to argue that our results have relevance for other poor economies mainly relying on 
low input-low output agriculture. Under these circumstances there is a large potential for higher yields, 
and a CDM project can vitalize the rural economy and extract this potential for productivity rise and 
further carbon accumulation in soil. A substantial negative leakage may thus turn out to be the rule 
rather than the exception for land use projects in such economies. 
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Income from CDM projects will be spent on both energy and food items. In poor agricultural 
economies food has a higher income share and will dominate in the resulting consumption growth, 
thus improving agricultural productivity and carbon sequestration. CDM projects targeting poor 
people’s land use may thus seem to yield more carbon mitigation for the same input than energy-
related projects primarily reaching the urban economies with higher fossil fuel intensity. So far, there 
has been much concern over carbon leakage in land use projects. However, a few percentage carbon 
leakage from plantations due to local peoples' harvest of primarily wood litter seems negligible as 
compared with the massive beneficial effects of project generated economic repercussions on 
agricultural productivity and soil carbon sequestration. 
 
A conclusion from our study could be that the cost-efficiency of the CDM portfolio could increase by 
being more balanced and focus less on energy, more on land use options for carbon mitigation and 
rural development. Land use projects in combination with bio-energy undertakings may seem 
particularly beneficial. It seems useful to increase work on identification of agricultural practices that 
bind carbon and can easily be monitored or driven by economic incentives. The potential for 
additional mitigation effects of land use projects also invite to considering general economic policies 
to enhance climate mitigation and reduce poverty simultaneously.   
 
There are many simplifications in our stylized approach. However, substantial economy-wide effects 
are identified - effects that are usually ignored in the on-site projects records and evaluations. A 
complete picture of CDM project efficiency should also include those issues to ensure proper 
verification of traded carbon emission rights.  
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Appendix 1 
The soil carbon module 
For all agricultural activities a carbon cycle covering above and belowground carbon is included in the 
model. For the plantation project, only the amount of carbon sequestered in trees is included. For 
agricultural crops, we include carbon both in biomass and soils. Every year 4 percent of carbon stock 
(CS) in the soil is released to the atmosphere, whereas soil organic carbon (SOC) in crop residues from 
the current crop is added to the stock. Soil organic carbon in one year (t-1) generated from the root and 
residue of crops left in the soil, enters the carbon stock in the soil the next year (t). Roots and residues 
are crop specific and proportional to the yield (harvest (X) per land unit (KL).  
 
 
, , 1 , 1
,
(1 0.04)
1 10.15 0.35
i t i t i t
i i
i t i i
i i i i
CS CS SOC
X hsSOC exxs retain
KL hs hs srs
− −= − +
⎛ ⎞−= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
hs= food share of food and stover 
srs= proportion of food and stover to roots 
retain = proportion of stover kept in soil 
exxs = crop specific calibration factor 
 
The model is based on data from Young (1989): 35 per cent of the carbon in roots and 15 per cent of 
carbon in stover is transferred to the soil organic carbon pool. The model furthermore accounts for the 
portion of stover retained in the field, the harvest index of the crop and the portion of roots as 
compared to aboveground biomass. 
 
Young A. 1989. Agroforestry for soil conservation CAB International, , Wallingford, Oxon 0X10 
8DE, UK, 276 pp. 
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Appendix 2 
The reference scenario (BAU)  
The idea behind the construction of the baseline or business as usual (BAU) scenario in this case is to 
create a development path where the economy remains close to its base year condition so that the 
development over time is only included to take into account the full time horizon of the plantation 
project. The implementation of the project is intended to be the only difference between status quo and 
the development path with the CDM project. The tree growth and carbon compensation are time 
dependent, hence we have a BAU scenario advancing over 20 years and adjust the major economic 
variables that lay the foundation for the baseline economic development over the project horizon. .  
Population growth 
The population growth is set to 2.5 percent per year. According to 
(http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/tanzania_statistics.html), total population of Tanzania in 2003 
was 36 977 000. The annual population growth was 3.2 percent during 1970-1990 and 2.7 percent 
during 1990-2003. 
Investments 
According to national accounts 2002 (National Bureau of Statistics Tanzania), the annual growth in 
real investments averaged 1.2 percent during 1992-2002, 3.9 percent 1995-2002, and 4.7 percent 
1997-2002. The investment growth rate has been quite unstable. During 1992-2002 real investment 
kept declining in the first five years and then increased over  the next five years. Over these 10 years 
GDP kept rising with yearly growth rates from 0.3 percent in 1993 to 6.2 percent in 2002. 
Considerable restructuring of the Tanzanian economy has taken place over these years, with 
considerable implications for productivity of capital assets.  
 
As shown in the SAM for Tanzania in 2000, the total capital stock was 3415 billion Tanzanian 
shillings (Tsh). At the same time, total investment is 1237 billion Tsh (in national accounts 2002, it 
was 1281 Tsh), accounting for 36 percent (37.5 based on NA data.  On the other hand, GDP in 2000 is 
7236 billion Tsh. Then capital-GDP ratio is 0.47, which implies that one more unit capital is expected 
to produce about two units of GDP if the ratio is stable in long run. Then we can expect the capital 
stock to increase only 2 percent per year if GDP grows 4 percent per year. Based on the relation 
capital stock (t+1) = capital stock (t) - deprecation (t) + investment (t), the depreciation could be 30 
percent or more of capital stock. 
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Technological change 
The factor neutral technological improvement in production is assumed to be one percent per year for 
every production activity. This corresponds to GDP per capita average growth rate during1990-2003 
of only one percent annually in Tanzania provided by www.unicef.org,. 
Simulated GDP growth path 
To form the baseline over the project horizon we let the annual level of investments grow at about 4 
percent per year. Factor neutral technical change is assumed to be one percent per year in all 
production sectors. Population growth rate and the associated rate of growth in the labour stock is set 
to 2.5 percent per year in average for the whole period. The government expenditure is assumed to 
grow at the same rate as the population. These assumptions lead to a development path caracterised by 
a growth rate declining from 6.3 percent per year in 2001 to 3.0 percent per year in 2020. This 
corresponds to an average growth rate of 4.0 percent per year over the whole period. 
Inflation 
Another feature of the economy in this country is the rather high inflation. Average annual rate of 
inflation at the period (1990-2003) is as high as 17 percent, which unfortunately cannot be reflected by 
our model since the CPI is the numeraire with value 1 constant over time. Generally the agricultural 
goods prices increase while the industrial goods prices decline, reflecting the assumption that the 
exogenous final demand (or real investment) is the same each year while the demand for consumption 
keeps growing over time. The exchange rate rises, which implies a lower value of local currency. 
Adjusting the Frisch parameter (ω ) in LES 
The elasticity of the marginal utility of expenditure (Frisch parameter) is a constant under many 
additive utility specifications including the LES system applied here (Frisch 1959, Sato 1972). In our 
model version the Frisch parameter for each household group is modified to take into account that the 
composition of demand is changing when household income is rising. 
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Appendix 3 
Investment driven alternative 
 
Table A3.1  Income1) and consumption growth by factor and household group. Investments 
driven2). 2001-2021. 2000-prices. B.Tsh 
Scenario 
Household groups Baseyear level 1 2 3 4 5 
Wage income 99668.54 329.49 259.75 2403.69 2.43 361.76 
Rural HH 64104.23 198.43 134.96 1503.97 2.45 225.02 
Poor below food 
poverty line 5205.34 14.02 7.34 114.21 0.35 16.68 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
7080.38 20.17 11.40 157.10 0.49 23.69 
Non-poor 51818.51 164.24 116.22 1232.66 1.61 184.65 
Urban HH 35564.30 131.06 124.80 899.71 -0.02 136.74 
Poor below food 
poverty line 1064.41 2.99 1.84 24.29 0.05 3.48 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
1589.93 4.93 3.49 36.91 0.04 5.56 
Non-poor 32909.97 123.13 119.46 838.52 -0.11 127.70 
Land rent 17810.84 36.91 -11.15 260.85 0.41 53.38 
Rural HH 16191.30 33.55 -10.13 237.13 0.37 48.52 
Poor below food 
poverty line 1965.77 4.07 -1.23 28.79 0.05 5.89 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
2575.46 5.34 -1.61 37.72 0.06 7.72 
Non-poor 11650.07 24.14 -7.29 170.62 0.27 34.91 
Urban HH 1619.54 3.36 -1.01 23.72 0.04 4.85 
Poor below food 
poverty line 158.16 0.33 -0.10 2.32 0.00 0.47 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
113.33 0.24 -0.07 1.66 0.00 0.34 
Non-poor 1348.05 2.79 -0.84 19.74 0.03 4.04 
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Table A3.1 (cont.) 
Scenario 
Household groups Baseyear level 1 2 3 4 5 
Profit 45709.58 41.54 -23.05 357.78 -0.85 62.17 
Rural HH 41566.00 38.19 -21.42 323.81 -0.74 57.27 
Poor below food 
poverty line 4871.48 4.84 -2.90 36.63 -0.06 7.35 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
6511.94 6.21 -3.60 49.91 -0.10 9.37 
Non-poor 30182.59 27.15 -14.92 237.27 -0.58 40.56 
Urban HH 4143.57 3.35 -1.63 33.97 -0.11 4.90 
Poor below food 
poverty line 312.71 0.35 -0.23 2.19 0.00 0.55 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
248.38 0.22 -0.12 1.96 -0.01 0.33 
Non-poor 3582.49 2.77 -1.28 29.82 -0.11 4.02 
HH income 222674.53 1719.61 1686.75 3771.62 3.69 1738.58 
Rural HH 152577.84 1527.78 65.72 2448.41 9.09 1702.52 
Poor below food 
poverty line 12746.74 181.01 -3.69 186.27 2.31 1543.17 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
17392.60 241.66 1.01 259.64 2.33 29.87 
Non-poor 122438.50 1105.12 68.40 2002.51 4.46 129.48 
Urban HH 70096.69 191.82 1621.04 1323.21 -5.40 36.06 
Poor below food 
poverty line 2894.25 15.62 3.74 49.03 -0.19 1.62 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
5270.52 11.42 8.81 90.52 -0.55 -0.89 
Non-poor 61931.93 164.79 1608.49 1183.66 -4.67 35.34 
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Table A3.1 (cont.) 
Scenario Household groups Baseyear 
level 1 2 3 4 5 
HH real 
consumption 200085.83 1612.12 1651.75 2790.53 1.61 1596.87 
Rural HH 138606.00 1348.99 131.70 1814.53 5.16 1485.41 
Poor below food 
poverty line 11894.93 155.98 -5.08 143.72 1.69 1422.08 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
15683.09 201.70 3.49 179.55 1.44 2.56 
Non-poor 111027.97 991.30 133.29 1491.26 2.03 60.78 
Urban HH 61479.83 263.14 1520.05 976.00 -3.55 111.46 
Poor below food 
poverty line 2775.16 16.19 5.60 44.57 -0.20 2.40 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
4843.23 12.92 13.27 71.23 -0.52 0.31 
Non-poor 53861.45 234.02 1501.18 860.20 -2.83 108.74 
1) Undiscounted real income. 
2) Scaled marginal saving rates by household group. No carbon premium to carbon sequestration by agriculture. 
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Table A3.2. Average income growth per capita per year. 2001-2021. Tsh 
Scenario 
Household groups Baseyear level 1 2 3 4 5 
Wage income 117100.62 387.12 305.18 2824.09 2.86 425.03 
Rural HH 93572.69 289.65 196.99 2195.34 3.57 328.46 
Poor below food 
poverty line 37688.62 101.50 53.12 826.95 2.51 120.79 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
56556.47 161.14 91.04 1254.86 3.89 189.20 
Non-poor 122860.10 389.42 275.56 2922.61 3.83 437.80 
Urban HH 214163.14 789.21 751.50 5417.94 -0.10 823.44 
Poor below food 
poverty line 58025.67 163.22 100.42 1323.94 2.67 189.82 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
82091.62 254.75 180.35 1905.70 2.17 286.97 
Non-poor 256407.39 959.33 930.74 6533.04 -0.83 994.95 
HH income 261620.43 2020.37 1981.77 4431.28 4.34 2042.66 
Rural HH 222717.26 2230.10 95.93 3573.93 13.27 2485.16 
Poor below food 
poverty line 92291.18 1310.59 -26.72 1348.64 16.69 11173.12 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
138928.11 1930.29 8.04 2073.92 18.60 238.60 
Non-poor 290297.93 2620.19 162.18 4747.88 10.58 307.00 
Urban HH 422112.29 1155.14 9761.64 7968.19 -32.53 217.16 
Poor below food 
poverty line 157779.06 851.41 203.83 2672.80 -10.14 88.31 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
272129.08 589.64 454.88 4673.86 -28.29 -46.11 
Non-poor 290297.93 2620.19 162.18 4747.88 10.58 307.00 
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Table A3.2 (cont.) 
Scenario Household groups Baseyear 
level 1 2 3 4 5 
HH consumption 235080.95 1894.08 1940.64 3278.60 1.89 1876.16 
Rural HH 202322.62 1969.11 192.25 2648.67 7.53 2168.25 
Poor below food 
poverty line 86123.78 1129.37 -36.77 1040.61 12.24 10296.36 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
125272.97 1611.13 27.87 1434.17 11.53 20.44 
Non-poor 263243.92 2350.35 316.03 3535.74 4.80 144.10 
Urban HH 370222.77 1584.56 9153.51 5877.31 -21.40 671.17 
Poor below food 
poverty line 151286.70 882.81 305.17 2429.55 -10.85 130.84 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
250067.09 667.19 685.01 3677.82 -26.95 16.11 
Non-poor 419644.07 1823.28 11695.98 6701.96 -22.06 847.24 
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Table A3.3. Average income growth per capita per day. 2001-2021. TSh 
Scenario 
Household groups Baseyear level 1 2 3 4 5 
Wage income 320.82 1.06 0.84 7.74 0.01 1.16 
Rural HH 256.36 0.79 0.54 6.01 0.01 0.90 
Poor below food 
poverty line 103.26 0.28 0.15 2.27 0.01 0.33 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
154.95 0.44 0.25 3.44 0.01 0.52 
Non-poor 336.60 1.07 0.75 8.01 0.01 1.20 
Urban HH 586.75 2.16 2.06 14.84 0.00 2.26 
Poor below food 
poverty line 158.97 0.45 0.28 3.63 0.01 0.52 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
224.91 0.70 0.49 5.22 0.01 0.79 
Non-poor 702.49 2.63 2.55 17.90 0.00 2.73 
HH income 716.77 5.54 5.43 12.14 0.01 5.60 
Rural HH 610.18 6.11 0.26 9.79 0.04 6.81 
Poor below food 
poverty line 252.85 3.59 -0.07 3.69 0.05 30.61 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
320.82 1.06 0.84 7.74 0.01 1.16 
Non-poor 795.34 7.18 0.44 13.01 0.03 0.84 
Urban HH 1156.47 3.16 26.74 21.83 -0.09 0.59 
Poor below food 
poverty line 432.27 2.33 0.56 7.32 -0.03 0.24 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
745.56 1.62 1.25 12.81 -0.08 -0.13 
Non-poor 1321.98 3.52 34.33 25.27 -0.10 0.75 
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Table A3.3 (cont.) 
Scenario Household groups Baseyear 
level 1 2 3 4 5 
HH consumption 644.06 5.19 5.32 8.98 0.01 5.14 
Rural HH 554.31 5.39 0.53 7.26 0.02 5.94 
Poor below food 
poverty line 235.96 3.09 -0.10 2.85 0.03 28.21 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
343.21 4.41 0.08 3.93 0.03 0.06 
Non-poor 721.22 6.44 0.87 9.69 0.01 0.39 
Urban HH 1014.31 4.34 25.08 16.10 -0.06 1.84 
Poor below food 
poverty line 414.48 2.42 0.84 6.66 -0.03 0.36 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
685.12 1.83 1.88 10.08 -0.07 0.04 
Non-poor 1149.71 5.00 32.04 18.36 -0.06 2.32 
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Appendix 4 
Savings driven scenarios  
 
Table A4.1 Income1) growth by factor and household group. 2001-2021. Bill. TSh 
Scenario 
Household groups Baseyear level 1 2 3 4 5 
Wage income 99857.15 692.21 730.65 1978.81 9.12 669.45 
Rural HH 64226.10 428.61 433.80 1236.20 6.73 420.24 
Poor below food 
poverty line 5215.19 31.91 30.57 93.78 0.69 31.85 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
7093.77 44.58 43.09 129.16 0.95 44.38 
Non-poor 51917.13 352.12 360.14 1013.25 5.09 344.01 
Urban HH 35631.06 263.61 296.85 742.61 2.39 249.21 
Poor below food 
poverty line 1066.43 6.76 6.74 19.93 0.12 6.68 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
1592.94 10.57 10.81 30.39 0.15 10.34 
Non-poor 32971.68 246.27 279.30 692.29 2.12 232.19 
Land rent 17842.25 81.28 46.55 218.81 1.45 90.76 
Rural HH 16219.85 73.89 42.32 198.91 1.31 82.51 
Poor below food 
poverty line 1969.24 8.97 5.14 24.15 0.16 10.02 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
2580.00 11.75 6.73 31.64 0.21 13.12 
Non-poor 11670.62 53.16 30.45 143.12 0.95 59.37 
Urban HH 1622.40 7.39 4.23 19.90 0.13 8.25 
Poor below food 
poverty line 158.44 0.72 0.41 1.94 0.01 0.81 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
113.53 0.52 0.30 1.39 0.01 0.58 
Non-poor 1350.43 6.15 3.52 16.56 0.11 6.87 
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Table A4.1 (cont.) 
Scenario 
Household groups Baseyear level 1 2 3 4 5 
Profit 45753.50 103.29 57.69 296.51 0.55 114.17 
Rural HH 41606.14 94.11 51.72 268.56 0.53 104.35 
Poor below food 
poverty line 4876.35 11.19 5.42 30.55 0.09 12.69 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
6518.33 14.84 7.70 41.50 0.10 16.64 
Non-poor 30211.46 68.08 38.60 196.51 0.34 75.03 
Urban HH 4147.36 9.18 5.98 27.95 0.01 9.81 
Poor below food 
poverty line 313.04 0.74 0.27 1.85 0.01 0.87 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
248.62 0.56 0.32 1.62 0.00 0.62 
Non-poor 3585.70 7.88 5.39 24.48 0.00 8.33 
HH income 222948.25 2340.57 2492.23 3036.70 14.14 2266.50 
Rural HH 152774.68 1937.37 588.45 1978.92 16.35 2050.96 
Poor below food 
poverty line 12765.58 213.42 37.37 151.97 2.96 1576.64 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
17417.53 285.84 57.02 212.30 3.20 66.32 
Non-poor 122591.57 1438.11 494.06 1614.65 10.20 408.00 
Urban HH 70173.57 403.20 1903.77 1057.78 -2.21 215.54 
Poor below food 
poverty line 2896.93 23.50 13.87 39.20 -0.07 8.28 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
5274.07 25.80 27.35 71.64 -0.37 11.36 
Non-poor 62002.57 353.89 1862.56 946.94 -1.78 195.90 
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Table A4.1 (cont.) 
Scenario 
Household groups Baseyear level 1 2 3 4 5 
HH real 
consumption 200287.21 1834.88 1940.56 2643.13 8.76 1782.17 
Rural HH 138751.96 1520.50 353.01 1688.32 10.27 1629.17 
Poor below food 
poverty line 11909.62 175.93 20.32 125.97 2.19 1442.71 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
15701.01 219.25 26.09 168.97 2.04 16.62 
Non-poor 111141.33 1125.33 306.60 1393.38 6.04 169.84 
Urban HH 61535.25 314.38 1587.55 954.81 -1.51 153.00 
Poor below food 
poverty line 2777.39 22.32 13.48 37.20 -0.10 7.56 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
4845.62 19.13 21.34 64.68 -0.40 5.53 
Non-poor 53912.24 272.92 1552.74 852.94 -1.01 139.91 
1) Undiscounted, accumulated real income. 
2) Fixed marginal savings rates. Marginal return to capital scaled to match the investment driven alternative. 
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Table A4.2 Income growth per capita per year. TSh. 2001-2021 
Scenario 
Household groups Baseyear level 1 2 3 4 5 
Wage income 117322.22 813.28 858.44 2324.90 10.72 786.53 
Rural HH 93750.58 625.63 633.21 1804.47 9.83 613.42 
Poor below food 
poverty line 37759.96 231.03 221.33 679.02 4.99 230.59 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
56663.41 356.10 344.19 1031.72 7.61 354.47 
Non-poor 123093.93 834.85 853.88 2402.39 12.07 815.64 
Urban HH 214565.15 1587.39 1787.59 4471.89 14.38 1500.71 
Poor below food 
poverty line 58136.06 368.74 367.32 1086.48 6.49 364.10 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
82247.44 545.91 558.35 1569.06 7.64 533.88 
Non-poor 256888.22 1918.72 2176.06 5393.76 16.53 1809.04 
HH income 261942.02 2749.94 2928.12 3567.82 16.62 2662.91 
Rural HH 223004.59 2827.98 858.96 2888.62 23.87 2993.77 
Poor below food 
poverty line 92427.60 1545.26 270.56 1100.33 21.40 11415.47 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
139127.27 2283.25 455.46 1695.78 25.53 529.75 
Non-poor 290660.86 3409.71 1171.41 3828.29 24.19 967.35 
Urban HH 422575.22 2427.99 11464.26 6369.82 -13.31 1297.95 
Poor below food 
poverty line 157924.94 1281.26 755.84 2137.03 -3.82 451.49 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
272312.48 1332.27 1412.14 3699.10 -18.85 586.29 
Non-poor 483073.02 2757.22 14511.53 7377.77 -13.83 1526.31 
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Table A4.2 (cont.) 
Scenario 
Household groups Baseyear level 1 2 3 4 5 
HH consumption 235317.55 2155.81 2279.96 3105.42 10.29 2093.87 
Rural HH 202535.68 2219.47 515.29 2464.43 14.99 2378.09 
Poor below food 
poverty line 86230.11 1273.81 147.12 912.09 15.88 10445.75 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
125416.11 1751.29 208.36 1349.69 16.26 132.77 
Non-poor 263512.68 2668.11 726.95 3303.66 14.32 402.68 
Urban HH 370556.47 1893.15 9559.99 5749.74 -9.07 921.36 
Poor below food 
poverty line 151408.37 1216.88 734.64 2027.78 -5.40 412.35 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
250190.75 987.93 1101.73 3339.53 -20.50 285.48 
Non-poor 420039.77 2126.39 12097.63 6645.38 -7.88 1090.06 
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Table A4.3. Average income growth per capita per day. 2001-2021. TSh 
Scenario 
Household groups Baseyear level 1 2 3 4 5 
Wage income 321.43 2.23 2.35 6.37 0.03 2.15 
Rural HH 256.85 1.71 1.73 4.94 0.03 1.68 
Poor below food 
poverty line 103.45 0.63 0.61 1.86 0.01 0.63 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
155.24 0.98 0.94 2.83 0.02 0.97 
Non-poor 337.24 2.29 2.34 6.58 0.03 2.23 
Urban HH 587.85 4.35 4.90 12.25 0.04 4.11 
Poor below food 
poverty line 159.28 1.01 1.01 2.98 0.02 1.00 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
225.34 1.50 1.53 4.30 0.02 1.46 
Non-poor 703.80 5.26 5.96 14.78 0.05 4.96 
HH income 717.65 7.53 8.02 9.77 0.05 7.30 
Rural HH 610.97 7.75 2.35 7.91 0.07 8.20 
Poor below food 
poverty line 253.23 4.23 0.74 3.01 0.06 31.28 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
381.17 6.26 1.25 4.65 0.07 1.45 
Non-poor 796.33 9.34 3.21 10.49 0.07 2.65 
Urban HH 1157.74 6.65 31.41 17.45 -0.04 3.56 
Poor below food 
poverty line 432.67 3.51 2.07 5.85 -0.01 1.24 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food overty 
line 
746.06 3.65 3.87 10.13 -0.05 1.61 
Non-poor 1323.49 7.55 39.76 20.21 -0.04 4.18 
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Table A4.3 (cont.) 
Scenario 
Household groups Baseyear level 1 2 3 4 5 
HH consumption 644.71 5.91 6.25 8.51 0.03 5.74 
Rural HH 554.89 6.08 1.41 6.75 0.04 6.52 
Poor below food 
poverty line 236.25 3.49 0.40 2.50 0.04 28.62 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
343.61 4.80 0.57 3.70 0.04 0.36 
Non-poor 721.95 7.31 1.99 9.05 0.04 1.10 
Urban HH 1015.22 5.19 26.19 15.75 -0.02 2.52 
Poor below food 
poverty line 414.82 3.33 2.01 5.56 -0.01 1.13 
Poor below basic 
need poverty line, 
above food poverty 
line 
685.45 2.71 3.02 9.15 -0.06 0.78 
Non-poor 1150.79 5.83 33.14 18.21 -0.02 2.99 
 
 
Table A4.4. Factor income1) growth. Savings driven. 2001-2021, BTsh 
Scenario 
 Base year level 1 2 3 4 5 
Wage income 99857.154 692.21 730.648 1978.806 9.122 669.447 
Land rent 17842.25 81.28 46.55 218.81 1.45 90.76 
Profit 45753.498 103.288 57.691 296.511 0.547 114.168 
Total 163452.902 876.775 834.892 2494.125 11.114 874.377 
Percent       
Wage income 61.1 78.9 87.5 79.3 82.1 76.6 
Land rent 10.9 9.3 5.6 8.8 13.0 10.4 
Profit 28.0 11.8 6.9 11.9 4.9 13.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1) Received by households. 
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Appendix 5 
GDP growth and plantation income and expenditure 
 
Table A5.1. Total GDP changes under various scenarios. 2001-2021. BTsh 
Total GDP change 
Scenario No. Total carbon premium 
Savings driven Investment driven 
Scenario 1 1244   998   359 
Scenario 2 1244 1226   399 
Scenario 3 1244 3311 4039 
Scenario 4 1244       1   -10 
Scenario 5 1244   887   344 
 
Table A5.2. Carbon premium and plantation cost.2001-2021. BTsh 
Year Carbon premium Land rent Labor cost 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
2019 
2020 
2021 
0.00 
8.35 
1.56 
2.75 
4.48 
6.12 
6.92 
10.23 
13.21 
17.06 
22.03 
27.36 
35.61 
47.35 
61.09 
78.80 
101.64 
131.09 
169.08 
218.05 
281.21 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
1.97 
1.62 
1.23 
0.86 
0.28 
0.07 
0.86 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.86 
0.86 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
Total 1243.99 3.39 9.47 
 
